Why GOOD Failed
With the rise of ethnonationalist politics, can GOOD stage a comeback, or has the political landscape shifted beyond its reach?
Among the many political casualties of the 2024 South African elections, the GOOD Party stands out as one of the biggest losers. To be clear, when referring to the GOOD Party, this does not include Patricia de Lille, who has thrived in government since becoming a minister in 2019. However, while "Aunty Pat" may be flourishing, her party is barely surviving.
Once considered a potential kingmaker, GOOD’s performance in the 2024 elections was deeply underwhelming. The party lost 40,907 national votes between 2019 and 2024—an alarming decline, particularly for a party contesting only its second election. One of the primary reasons for this downturn is the shift in focus after de Lille assumed ministerial duties. As her presence within the party diminished, GOOD struggled to retain voters. Without de Lille actively leading the charge, the party lacked both appeal and direction.
GOOD had the potential to become a formidable force among young, progressive voters. Its centre-left politics, including a strong push for universal basic income, should have resonated with young South Africans seeking alternatives to both the Democratic Alliance’s liberalism and the radical rhetoric of parties like the EFF or MK. Yet, despite having the right policies on paper, the party failed not only to attract new supporters but also to retain its existing base.
A significant portion of GOOD’s core support has come from Coloured voters in the Western Cape, particularly those disillusioned with the DA. While this provided a strong foundation, the party did little to expand beyond it. The Patriotic Alliance (PA) stepped in to fill this void for two key reasons: GOOD’s weak campaign strategy and its over-reliance on de Lille’s personal brand. For years, de Lille was seen as the primary political representative of the Coloured community at large. However, as she became more focused on governance rather than grassroots engagement, many felt abandoned.
This sense of disconnection was exacerbated by broader socio-political frustrations within the Coloured community. Many feel their socio-economic position has remained stagnant since 1994, leading to a shift towards parties like the National Coloured Congress (NCC) and the PA, which have embraced an explicitly ethnonationalist approach. This political realignment is not merely about policy but also identity—an attempt to reclaim a sense of agency in a political landscape that many Coloured voters feel has overlooked them.
Whether this shift from GOOD’s inclusive politics to the NCC and PA’s more radical stance is justified is a separate debate. However, it does reflect a deep-seated frustration. Some elements within the Coloured community have clung to apartheid-era indoctrination—the belief that Coloured people hold a higher social standing than black South Africans. Yet, this perception ignores the broader reality: black South Africans continue to face systemic economic challenges, and while a minority have ascended to positions of power, poverty and inequality remain pervasive across both communities.
GOOD’s failure in 2024 was not simply a result of poor campaigning; it was the inevitable outcome of a party that failed to solidify itself beyond the personality of its leader. Its progressive platform had the potential to engage a younger, more diverse electorate, but its inability to capitalise on this means it risks fading into political irrelevance.
As Patricia de Lille’s chapter with GOOD appears to be closing, the question is whether Brett Herron can salvage the party. However, this is not just a test of Herron’s leadership—it is a question of whether GOOD can rebuild and expand beyond its traditional Coloured voter base. The pendulum has swung, and if GOOD hopes to regain relevance, it must rethink its strategy before it is too late.